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NOTES
DOMICILE AS AFFECTED

W TREATIES OF EXTERRITORIALITY.

How far treaties and laws granting exterritorial privileges
to foreigners shall affect the right of such foreigners to acquire
a domicile in the country granting the privileges, is a problem
which has furnished a most interesting difference of judicial
opinion.
One of the earliest cases which dealt with the subject was
that of The Indian Chief,' decided in x8oi. In this case an
American consul at Calcutta was held to be a British merchant
within the meaning of certain acts, but the case is chiefly interesting for the line of demarcation which is drawn between the
acquisition of domicile in Western countries and in the East.
The Court says: 2 "But in the East, from the oldest times,
an immiscible character has been kept up; foreigners are not
13

Rob. Adm., 12 (x8os).

' At page 29.
(543)
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admitted into the general body and mass of the society of the
nation; they continue strangers and sojourners, as all their
fathers were. Doris ainara stat non intermiscuit undans;
not acquiring any national character under the general sovereignty of the country, and not trading under any recognized
authority of their own original country, they have been held
to derive their present character from that of the association
or factory under whose protection they live and carry on their
trade."
This case, therefore, will be seen to advance the old theory
of immiscibility; but at the same .time to indicate, in the last
few lines quoted, the foundation of the so-called Anglo-Indian
cases to which we may well advert briefly. These cases
have uniformly held that British citizens who have gone
to India to live have by so doing acquired a domicile there, not purely Indian, but a domicile subject to
that body of English law in force in India as amended and
limited by Indian customs and caste distinctions.
The origin of the doctrine of these cases arose from the
nature of the East Indih Company and was originally applied
to employees of that company, 3 though later extended to others
who went on private business and settled there.' In explaining the doctrine, Turner, L. J., describes the East India Company as follows: 5 "The government of the East India Cornpany was in a high degree, if hot wholly, a separate and independent government, foreign to the government of this country. and it may well have been thought that persons who had
covenanted obligations with such a government for services
abroad could not reasonably be considered to have intended to
retain their domicile here. They, in fact, became as much
estranged from this country as if they had become the servants
of a foreign government."
Originating, then, in what was considered an anomalous
political condition, the doctrine of Anglo-Indian domicile became firmly established.
The next case of importance was that of Maltassv. Maltass.
There the question was as to the distribution of the estate
of one who had lived almost all his life in Smyrna, and had.
died there. His parents were British citizens, however, and
he had been educated in England. The Court held that his
case came directly within the provisions of the treaty between
' Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229 (t79o).
"Cockrell v. Cockrell, 25 L J. (Ch.) 73o (1856).
' fopp v. Wood, 34 L. J. (Ch.) 212 (i865).
'i Rob. Eec. 67 (844).
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England and Turkey, and that his estate was distributable by
English law. The Court continued, however, as follows: 1 "I
give no opinion, therefore, whether a British subject can or
cannot acquire a Turkish domicile; but this I must say, I think
every presumption' is against the intention of British Christian subjects voluntarily becoming domiciled in the dominions
of the Porte."
This case, therefore, carefully avoided a decision of the
problem before us, and merely indicated a presumption against
the acquisition of such domicile. WVe come, too, to the case of
In re Too tars Trusts, which is at the present time the leading
authority on the English interpretation of the question. There
it was necessary to determine the domicile of the testator in
order to decide whether or not his estate was subject to certain
legacy duties imposed on estates of those domiciled in England. The testator's domicile of origin was England. In 1862
he went to reside in Shanghai and entered business there. He
intended to reside there permanently, and did reside there till
his death, in 1878. It was not contended that he had established a Chinese domicile, but the argument was pressed that
he had established an Anglo-Chinese domicile in analogy to
the Anglo-Inaian domicile. There existed at the time a treaty
of exterritoriality between China and Great Britain. Mr. Justice Chitty delivered the opinion and decided that there was no
such thing as an Anglo-Chinese domicile. He argued that no
analogy could be drawn to the Anglo-Indian decisions because
they had gone upon the distinct foreign government, as it were,
of the East India Company, while in China the English community was not in any respect the territorial sovereign. Mr.
Justice Chitty then advances the proposition that an individual
cannot "become domiciled as a member of a community wbich
is not the community possessing the supreme or sovereign territorial power." 9 It is on this account that he repudiates the
idea of the possibility of an Anglo-Chinese domicile. While
Mr. Justice Chitty was doubtless correct in considering an
Anglo-Chinese domicile as an anomaly, his reasoning is no answer to the theory of the American cases, namely, that a
Chinese domicile is acquired which, by force of the Chinese
law, renders the decedent's estate distributable by the laws
of the American court at Shanghai. This theory avoids all
anomalous "double domicile" perplexities.
'At page 8o.

L R. 23, Ch. Div. 532 (1883).
'At page 538, 39-

NOTES

The case of lit re Tootal's Trusts, however, was approved,
10
and literally followed in the case of Abd-ul-Mcssil. v. Farra,
where it was held that the doctrine applied equally to Cairo,
the court refusing to recognize the possibility of an AngloEgyptian domicile.
The foregoing cases represent all the English authorities on
the question, and the English view may therefore be summed
up as follows: in the Western or Christian nations, the ordinary rules of domicile apply; in the Eastern countries every
presumption is against the establishment of a domicile in such
countries; and no such thing as Anglo-Chinese or AngloEgyptian domicile is recognized as capable of existence; though
an Anglo-Indian domicile has been recognized, owing to the
very anomalous conditions existing in India.
Turning now to the American solution of the problem we
find that there are only two authorities on the subject.
The first of these is the case of In re Young J. Allen," decided by Wifley, J., of the United States Court at Shanghai,
China, in 1907.

The facts in that case were as follows: Dr. Allen was born
in Georgia in 1836. In i86o he moved to China, where he
lived continuously for forty-seven years. He died in Shanghai
in 19o7. He had often expressed his intention to make China
his permanent home. Wifley, J., in his opinion, carefully considers the doctrine of In re Tootal's Trusts, but finds himself
unable to agree with it. His position is reinforced by the fact
that 'Mr. Justice Chitty's decision had been ably attacked even
in his own country by both Sir Francis Piggott, Chief Justice
of Hongkong,12 and by Hall, the English authority on International Law.1 3 Wifley; J., reached the conclusion that under the
present conditions in China and in view of the present commercial intercourse, the old idea that every presumption was
against the acquisition of a Chinese domicile by a foreigner
could now no longer be considered sound.
This conclusion of judge Wifley's has been favorably commented upon by Professor Huberich, of Stanford University,
in a most able discussion of the entire subject, 4 though Professor Huberich finds that the reasons assigned by Judge
Wifley are lacking in clearness, and tend to confuse the ques13 App. Cas. 431 (1888).
rIIAm. J. of Int. Law, ro2 (90o7).
" 1Piggott, Extraterritoriality, pp. 228, 23o, 232, 233.
" Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown, pp. 184-86.
is24 Law Quarterly Review, p. 440-448.
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tiot. as to the amount of evidence necessary to overcome the
presumpt:on against the acquisition of a domicile in China
with the question of the legal possibility of acquiring such a
domicile under any circumstances.
It is therefore a matter of satisfaction to find such an able
opinion as that of Spear, J., in the case of Mathcr v. Cunningham," which has lately appeared in the advance sheets of the
Atlantic Reporter, and which constitutes the only other American authority.
In this case Henry Cunningham was born in "Mainein 1838.
In 1854 he went to Australia, and in 1857 he became a river
pilot at Shanghai, and continued to reside there till his death,
in i9o5. In distributing his estate, the question was whether
his domicile was in Maine or in China. judge Spear admitted that "domicile" neces.,arily implied subjection and obedience to local laws, but then proceeded to prove that an American making his home in China did submit to Chinese law. He
points out that the only power which the American jurisdiction
at Shanghai has exists solely by force of the permission of the
supreme power of China. which still retains the sovereignty.
He continues as follows: 11 "In other words, if the identical
la's which now govern Americans upon this territory had
been promulgated by edict, instead of permitted by treaty, the
estate of the decedent would, without question, have been conceded a domicile in Shanghai. Now, then, as a practical question, what logical reason can be given for declaring the existence of domicile in the one case and not in the other? The
decedent would have lived under precisely the same laws and
upon the same foreign soil. Although the Emperor had suspended some of the Chinese laws, and permitted the extension
of American law to the territory, yet the source of the law was
the Emperor, who had never released his sovereignty over the
soil."
judge Spear then comes to the conclusion that as a matter
of fact, Cunningham had established a Chinese domicile,
since the doctrine of immiscibility should no longer be of
such weight as to establish a presumption paramount to all
other evidence. He then proceeds to determine whether, as a
matter of law, there was any reason why such domicile could
not be established, and after an extensive review of the English
cases, and the other American case, his conclusion is that there
is no valid argument against the right to acquire such domiS74 Atlantic Rep. 8o9 (igog).
'At page 814.
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cile. While admitting that the English have been cprrect in
refusing to recognize the anomalous Anglo-Chinese domicile,
yet he points out that the objection is in reality to the name
only, and that there is no objection to the recognition of a
Chinese domicile, which by force of a treaty makes a decedent's estate subject to English law. This, he suggests, is the
true basis on which the Anglo-Indian cases can be sustained.
The reasoning in the last-cited case appears thoroughly
sound, and the earlier perplexities of the problem become
wholly simplified, if worked out along this line of thought.
It is submitted, therefore, that a brief summary of the correct solution of the problem would be as follows:
I. As a iuatter of law, one test of domicile should be applied to all countries alike, and this test is the animus et factum,
both of which must concur with respect to a given sovereign
locality.
2. As a imatter of fact, whether or not the animus et faqctum,
have occurred must be determined from the particular circumstances, just as any other question of fact, but in determining
this question of fact the locality should be considered, and
may, from its political condition, raise a presumption of fact
agains the required animus, but this presumption should
always be rebuttable.
Thus in the case of a testator who died while residing in
the midst of a savage African tribe, the presumption of fact
would be very strong against the necessary animus to establish a domicile, but the rule of law would apply as definitely
and as clearly as if the testator had died in France, or in any
other enlightened country, and the confusion and conflict inci(lent to the English doctrine would be wholly avoided. As for
the influence of treaties of exterritoriality, it is submitted
that their only effect would be to raise a slight presumption in
favor of the necessary animus; for in selecting a new domicile
of choice, the fact that his affairs would be regulated by the
common law of his own country would tend to influence a man
W. L. M.
in favor of the new domicile.
THE POWER

O
THE STATE TO REGULATE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE BUSINESS THEREIN IS SUBORDINATE TO TIE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

The United States Supreme Court held in the recent case
of Westcrn Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, ex rel. Coleinan,1 that the exaction from the defendant company for the
2U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Sheets, Feb. zo, rg9o (2z6 U. S.), p. X.
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benefit of the permanent school fund (under the authority of
Kansas Gen. Stat. 1901, p. 285, § 1264; Gen. Stat. i9o5, p.
290, § 133b) of a charter fee of a given per cent. of its
entire authorized capital stock as a condition of its continuing

to do local business in the State, is invalid under the commerce
and due process of law clauses of the Federal Constitution as
necessarily amounting to a burden and tax on the company's
interstate business and on its property located or used outside
the State.'
Under this statute the Western Union Telegraph Company
made application to the chaiter board r for permission to engage in business in Kansas as a foreign corporation, stating
that the amount of its capital stock, fully paid up in cash, was
$iOOOOO,OOO.
The charter board granted the application of the telegraph
company, subject to the proviso, "that the order should not
take effect and no certificate of authority slhould issue or be
delivered to the company 'until such applicarnt shall have paid
to the State Treasurer of Kansas, for the benefit of the permanent school fund, the sum of twenty thousand, one hundred
dollars ($20,100), being the charter fee provided by law necessary to be paid by a foreign corporation having a capital of
$xoo,ooo,ooo.'"
The interstate and federal government business was expressly excluded from the operation of the proviso and it was therein expressly stated "that this grant of
authority and requirement as to payment relate only to the
business transacted wholly within the State of Kansas."
The telegraph company refused to pay the charter fee and
continued, as before, to do telegraph business of all kinds in
Kansas. Thereupon, the Attorney General of Kansas brought
this action of quo warranto in the State Courts, the sole ground
of complaint being that, in consequence of the failure of the
telegraph company to pay the charter fee of $20,100, it was
without authority to continue doing any intrastate or local
business in the State. The Supreme Court of Kansas issued
a decree restraining the company from transacting local business in the State, except so far as the company's duties to, or
contracts with, the United States should be affected. 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decree of the
'U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Sheets, Feb. 15, igio, p. I9O (Lawyer's Cooperative Pub. Co.). (Opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan.)
'For Act creating charter's bnard, see Kan. Gen. Stat, igox, § i26o.
Gen. Stat. 19o5, § 1332.
"State ex rel. Coleinan as Attorney General v. Western Union TeL

Co., 7s Kan. 6og (xgo7).
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Kans.as Supreme Court substantially for the reasons given in
the upening paragraph of this note. The concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice White, while not dissenting from the fundamental principles advanced by the majority, was based primarily upon the reasoning that the defendant company was
already in the State, by the State's acquiescence or implied invitation, and the aforesaid conditions could only be imposed,
if at all, as the price of allowing it to come in.
Mr. Justice Holmes rendered a dissenting opinion, in which
Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice McKenna concurred. The
dissenting opinion took the position (a) that the State of Kansas, having the absoitte power of excluding the foreign corporation, the defendant, it could impose such conditions upon
permitting the corporation to do business within its limits as
it may judge expedient, and that it may make the grant or
privilege dependent upon the payment of a sum proportioned to
the amount of its capital; (b) that the consequence is the
measure of the condition and when the only consequence of a
breach is a result which the State may bring about in ile first
place, the condition cannot be unconstitutional; (c) that by the
decision in this case the Supreme Court abandons its latest
decision, viz., Security Mut. Life ins. Co. v. Prewitt;6 (d) that
in the absence of contract, the power of the State is not
affected by the fact that the corporation concerned is already
in the State, or even has been there for some time.
The principal case was followed in Pulhnan Company v.
Kansas,0 where the same general question arose under the
same statute.
If State legislation, in fact, violates the Federal Constitution
it is void, notwithstanding the fact that the legislature may not
have intended to transgress that instrument. In determining
whether the legislature has exceeded the limits of its authority
the courts must look at the substance of the legislation. For
instance, a State may not in the exercise of one of the powers
given or reserved to it by the Constitution violate any of the
provisions of that instrument. Therefore, a State may not in
the exercise of its taxing power, or of its police power, lay a
burden on interstate commerce.T

0202 U.

S. :246, 5o L Ed. 1013, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 61g, 6 A. & E. Am.

Cas. 317.
4 216 U. S. 56 (1909).
'Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa., 114 U. S. 196 (license for carrying
on interstate commerce; Phila. & So. S. S. Co. v. Pa., 122 U. S. 426
(iS86), tax on gross receipts, derived from interstate and foreign
commerce; Patterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 41! (1888).
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The reported decisions show a pronounced difference of
opinion among the judiciary in regard to the powers of a State
over a foreign corporation, desiring to enter it, or to remain
in it, if it is already in the State, to carry on therein an intrastate business. Omitting, however, all expressions of opinion
in the cases which are not necessary to the decision of the
court, it would seem from them that the following principles of
law have been laid down by the United States Supreme Court:
i. Full power and control over its territories, its citizens,
and its business belong to the State. In this way it derives
its power to control and regulate foreign corporations in it
and to prescribe the conditions upon which they may cary on
intrastate business. This principle is subject to two exceptions:
A State cannot exclude from its limits, (a) a corporation engaged i:i interstate or foreign commerce; nor can it exclude
(b) a corporation employed by the Federal Government as its
agent in carrying out one or more of the powers given to the
Federal Government by the Federal Constitution.8
2. The power of the State in this respect is the same whether
the foreign corporatiun is without the State desiring to enter
the State to carry on therein intrastate business or whether the
corporation is in the State and merely desires the right to continue to do an intrastate business; provided, that the State has
not contracted away its power to regulate it in this regard.
3. It is unconstitutional for a State to impose as a prerequisite condition to the-enjoyment of the right to do intrastate business, that the foreign corporation shall surrender
any of its rights under the Federal Constitution or that it shall
tax on gross receipts of telegraph company, engaged in interstate com-

merce; G. H. & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (19o8),
tax on gross receipts of railway engaged in interstate commerce.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, io5 U. S. 460 (i88i), tax on interstate telegraph messages; Robbins v. Shelby Cy. Taxing Dist., i2o U.
S. 489 (1886); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289 (1894); Asher v.
Texas, 128 U. S. 129 (i098); Stoutenberg v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141
(189); Stockard v. Morgan, x85 U. S. 27 (igor); Caldwell v. N. Car.,
187 U. S. 622 (1902). The above cases refer to license taxes on commercial "drummers" engaged in interstate commerce. Crutcher v. Ky.,
141 U. S.47 (i8go), license tax on agent of express company carrying on
interstate business in the State; Ling v. Mich., 135 U. S. 161 (i8go),
burden on interstate commerce; Ling v. Harden, 135 U. S. xoo (1889) ;
Brenner v. Rebntan, 138 U. S. 78 (189o), meat inspection, burdening
interstate commerce.
'Doyle v. The Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535 (1876). at page
536. Exceptions: (a) Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 96 U. S. I; (b) Pembina, etc., Co. v. Pa., T25 U. S. 181; see also
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in Pullman v. Kansas, 216 U.
S. 56 (igio).
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do that which is equivalent thereto; i.e., enter into a binding
agreement, specifically enforceable, not to exercise certain of
its rights thereunder. 9
4- Since a State has the right and power to withhold or
grant the privilege to a foreign corporation, regardless of its
reasons for so doing, it follows that it may withdraw the grant
of the privilege for any reason whatever and may even provide that an exercise by the grantee foreign corporation of a
right possessed by it under the Federal Constitution, as, for
instance, its right in the proper cases to remove litigation
to which it is a party from the State to the Federal courts,
shall be cause for the withdrawal by the State of said privilege. Moreover, this provision for its withdrawal may be
made in the same State statute which provides for the granting
by the State to the foreign corpotation of this privilege.' 0
The distinguishing factor between the class of cases represented by paragraph three and that represented by paragraph
four is that in the former the corporation surrenders one or
more of its constitutional rights, while in the latter it does
not.
The majority opinion 1 distinguished Insurance Company v.
Prce'ilt from the principal case, on the ground tlmt "the business of the insurance company involved in the former case was
not, as this Court has often adjudged, interstate commerce,
while the business of the telegraph company was primarily and
mainly that of interstate commerce." While it is true that the
issuing of a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce, but a simple contract of indemnity against loss,' 2 it is,
nevertheless, true that in both cases the privilege which lay in
the grant of the State was that of carrying on intrastate
business. That in the present case the intrastate business
happened to be intrastate commerce, cannot have the effect of
making it any the less intrastate business, and, as such, subject
to State regulation, as hereinbefore set forth. It is respectfully submitted that the former case should preferably be distinguished from the present case on the ground that in the
former case the surrender of the right of removal of litigation
from the State courts to the Federal court!: in the proper cases.
'Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 2o Wall. 445 (1874); Barron Y.
Burnside, 121 U. S. 186 (1887); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas,
ante.
" Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535 (1876), at p. 536; Ins. Co. v.
Preuitt,202 U. S. 246 (9o6).

" At p. 45.

22Paul v. Va., 8 Wall. i68 (1868), at p. 183.

NOTES

553

was not a condition prerequisite to the granting of the privilege, but rather that the exercise of that right was designated
by the statute as a sufficient cause for the withdrawal of the
privilegc, 13 while in the present case the defendant corporation
is required as a prerequisite condition of the granting of the
privilege to burrender two of its rights under the Federal Constitution.
To justify the placing of the present case under the principle of paragraph three instead of that of paragraph four, two
propositions must appear: (a)that the condition was a prerequisite to the granting and enjoyment of the privilege by
the defendant corporation; (b) that the condition required a
suriender of one or more of defendant's rights under the Federal Constitution.
That the payment of the charter fee was a condition prerequisite to the right of the defendant to engage in intrastate
business in Kansas is apparent (a) from the statute providing
for the charter fee; (b) from the wording of the grant by the
charter board of the defendant's application to do such a
business, and (c) from the fact that the Attorney General of
Kansas, on behalf of the State, brought this action of quo warranto, thereby contending that the defendant corporation had
no authority to do such intrastate business, by reason of the
non-payment of the charter fee prescribed by the statute.
This condition precedent to the granting of said privilege to
defendant deprives defendant of its constitutional rights (i)
by depriving it of its property without due process of law;
(2) by imposing a burden on its interstate commerce, in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
The tax imposed on defendant as a charter fee is a specified percentage of the total capitalization of the defendant.
This capitalization represents property of the defendant, situated throughout the entire Union, and engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce in each of the several States.
The tax is, therefore, in effect one in part upon property situated without the State of Kansas and, therefore, a taking of
defendant's property without due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
It is also a burden upon the interstate commerce transacted by the company. Telegraphic communications are cominerce.' 5 The defendant is engaged in transmitting, for a
"This distinction seems to be justified by the majority opinion.
Ins. Co. v. Prewitt,94 U. S. 535, at p. 538.
" Union Refrigcrating Transit Co. v. Ky., xgg U. S. 94 (i9o5).
'Lcloup v. Port of Mobile, i27 U. S. 64o (x888).
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pecuniary remuneration, telegraph communications from one
State to another. Subject to some individual exceptions, the
rule is, that in classifying property for taxation some benefit
It is
to the property taxed is a controlling consideration."
often said protection and payment of taxes are correlative obligations.17
Tested by any of these tests, it is at once seen that this is
not a bona fide tax on the property of the company used or
operated by it within the State, or upon its intrastate business. A company with less of such property within the State
of Kansas, but with a higher total capitalization, would pay
a greater tax than a company with more of such property
within the State of Kansas, but with a lower total capitalization. The same reasoning applies with equal force if we
view the tax as a license tax for the privilege of doing an
intrastate business. The amount of the tax is independent of
the amount of such business and depends *upon one factor only
and that is the total capitalization. The total capitalization
has no necessary or fixed relation to the intrastate business of
the defendant company in Kansas. Therefore, if the tax is a
license tax, it is one not for the privilege of carrying on intrastate commerce, but interstate commerce, and, therefore, unconstitutional."'
At this point attention should be rlled to the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice White in Pulnaa Co. v. Kansas," in
which he intimates strongly, "that where the right to do an
interstate commerce business exists without regard to the
assent of the State, a State law which arbitrarily forbids a corporation from carrying on with its interstate commerce business a local business would be a direct burden upon interstate
con-merce, . . .", and that it imposed a direct burden on
interstate commerce because the imposition on a corporation,
which has the right to do interstate commerce business within
the State, of an unconstitutional burden for the privilege of
doing a.local business is the exact equivalent of placing a direct
burden on is interstate commerce business.
This view raises squarely the question whether or not the
withholding of the right to transmit local messages over its
wires, does, in fact, increase the cost of transmitting interstate
messages. While this question is a technical one and cannot
"Noruood v. Baker, 172 U. S.
" Union Refrigerating Transit Co. v. Ky., ante.

"Phila. &- Southern S. S. Co. v. Pa.,
ante, foot-note (7).

122

U. S..326 (x886), see

NOTES

555

be adequately treated in this note, it is suggested that the
telegraph business, like the railroad business, is one of increasing returns; that this is true until the maximum economic
capacity of the wires is obtained; and that an arbitrary decrease, by reason of the inability of th -orporation to carty oil
local business, of the total amount of business carried over
each wire would seem inevitably to require a larger percentaga.
of the fixed and operating expenses to each interstate message
and therefore to an increased cost per message. This additional cost would roughly represent the burden imposed if the
defendant corporation is deprived, by reason of the non-payment of the charter fee, of the right to carry on intrastate
business."'
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court (the majority
opinion) distinguished the present case from that of Prewitt v.
Ins.

C0.20

on the ground that the defendant in the present case

was engaged in interstate commerce, quare, does the intimation
in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White indicate that in
the case of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce a
State cannot make the grant of the right to cariy on intrastate
business in connection therewith, defeasible upon the cxercise

by it of a right under the Federal Constitution.

(Compare

paragraph 4, ante.)
For the foregoing reasons, and without adopting the view
of the dissenting judges that the present case marks a departure
by the Court from its decision in Insurance Company v. Prewitt, but, rather, that that case is distinguishable from the present case, we must agree with the decision of the majority of
the Court in the case now under discussion.

LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANY TO PROPERTY OWNER.

Is a water company, which has contracted with a municipality to supply water, liable to an individual property owner
whose property is destroyed by fire as a result of the negligence of the company in supplying the water? The well-considered case of German Alliance Insurance Company v. Home
39Compare:
Darnell & Son Co. v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113; Amnerican Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 5oo. (A State may not in
the exercise of is taxing power discriminate against interstate commerce.)
U202 U. S. 246 (igo6).
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Water Supply Company' denies such liability either in contract
or in tort. This case is undoubtedly supported by the great
weight of authority, and seems to be absolutely sound. Let
us consider first the liability in contract.
In the first place, it is settled that if the municipality itself
undertakes to supply water to its citizens, it' is not liable ior
negligence in the performance of the work. The power to
establish water works is regarded as a governmental function,
entrusted by the State to the municipality as its agent. Following out this idea, it has been held :hat when the municipality contracts with a private company for its water supply, it
constitutes the company its agent, and since the act of the
agent is the act of the principal, and in doing the act no higher
duty can rest on the agent than would have rested on the principal, the property owner cannot recover from the company
because it could not have recovered from the municipality.'
This theory, however, seems unsound. There can be no recovery from the municipality because, as sovereign, in the performance of a governmental function, it is exempt from all
liability; but this exemption certainly cannot be delegated to
a private company.
When the contract is made by the city with the water company, prima facie the individual citizen has no rights under it,
because of lack of privity; and in the earliest cases on the
question in this country, recovery was refused on this ground
alone.4 But it was soon recognized that one not a party to a
contract might recover on it if he was the sole beneficiary, and
the real question is whether the property owner in the contract
under discussion comes within this rule.
The case of Vroomnan v. Turner' is a leading case on the
right of a beneficiary to sue. It is there held that there are two
essentials to such right: (i ) there must be an intention on the
part of the promisee to secure some benefit to the third party;
(2) there must be some privity between the promisee and the
third party which would give the latter a legal or equitable
claim to the benefit of the promise. There is considerable conflict as to whether the second point is really necessary, and the
%i74 Fed. 764.
U. S. i. Sault Ste. Marie, I37 Fed. 258; Springfield Ins. Co. v.
Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46.
1 Thopson v. [Voter Co., 215 Pa. 275; Nichol v. Water Co., 53 W.
Va. 348

' Nickerson v. Water Co., 46 Conn. 24; Foster v. Water Co., 3 Fed.

(Tenn.) 42.
'69 N. Y.
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majority of the cases apparently do not require it. Those jurisdictions which do recognize it would of course deny the right
of the property owner to recover from the water company,
because there is no such privity between the owner and the
municipality.
But the first essential is universally recognized. Applying it,
the majority of the cases hold that there is no such intention
to benefit the individual citizen-that the benefit to him is indirect.7 Directly contra to this are the decisions in North Carolina, Kentucky and Florida. In these jurisdictions the water
company is held liable, on the ground that the people are the
sole beneficiaries under the contract; that they are taxed to pay
the consideration for the contract; and that one of a class of
beneficiaries can sue if the class is sufficiently designated.$
But the view that the benefit is indirect seems more correct.
The water company undertakes to supply water to the municipality, and the municipality itself applies the water for the
benefit of the public by means of its fire department. As is
said in our principal case, the mere supply of water would be
of little avail. Farnham, in his work on waters,6 considers
unsound the theory of recovery by the property owner as the
beneficiary, but asserts that he should be allowed to recover
upon the ground that the municipality acts as his agent in
making the contract with the water company.' This, however,
is answered in the principal case, where Osborne, J., says:
"The city may in a sense be the agent of the citizens in the
aggregate, but not separately and individually."
One citizen could not sue on such a contract any more than
one of a hundred joint principals could sue alone on a contract
made by the common agent. On no ground, therefore, can.
recovery on the contract be allowed.
It is equally difficult to establish liability in tort. To hold
the company liable, there must be a breach of a duty owed to
the individual citizen, and here there is no relation whatever
between the company and the citizen. The city is under no
duty to the public to establish water works, and the water
•Howsman i, Water Co., 23 L. R. A. 146 (Mo.); Becker v. Water
Works Co., 79 Iowa 419; Ferris v. Water Co., I6 Nev. 44.
'Akron Waler Co. v. Brownless, 1o Ohio C. C. 62o; House v. Water
Co., 88 Tex. 233; Bush v. Water Co., 43 Pac. 69 (Idaho); Eaton v.
Water Co., 37 Neb. 546; Wainwright v. Water Co., 78 Hun, (N. Y.)
146; see also principal case.
' Gorrel v. W17atcr Co., 124 N. C. 328; Water Co. v. Tigon, 112 Ky.
775; Paducah Timber Co. v. Water Co., 89 Ky. 34o; Mugge v. Water
Works, 52 Fla. 371.
'Faruham, Waters, pp. 842-851.
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company assuies none by the contract with the city. There
must first be a contract relationi with the taxpayer before he
can sue in tort." It has been hcld that the company assumes a
iublic duty by undertaking to supl)ly the water; that the
people. relying upon the contract, neglect to provide for other
sources of supply." But this is certainly unsound. The mere
fact that A relics upon the performance of a contract made by
B with C does iot establish any duty on the part of C to A to
exercise care in the performance of the contract.
The sound an( logical result would seem to be that the water
company is not liable to the property owner either in tort or in
contract. This result may not be satisfactory, and may well be
an appropriate subject for change by the Legislature; because,
as Judge Freeman points out in a note to Britton v.. Water
Co.,' 2 if the contract is not made for the benefit of the
11orks
taxpayer in such a sense that lie can sue upon it, it is not made
for his benefit in such a sense that the city can recover damages
in his name. Loss by fire in such case would therefore be
damnum absque injuria. and for the protection of the people a
change might well be made.
R.C.H.

FEXTRA-TERRITORTAL EFF1CT OF LEGITIMATION.

The recent affirmance by the United States Supreme Court
of the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in the case
of Ohnsted v. Olnsfed' raises again the interesting question of
the extra-territorial effect of a legitimation by a subsequent
marriage. The facts in this case were briefly as follows:
Real estate situated in New York was left to Benjamin F.
Olmsted for life. with remainder to his lawful children. After
having four legitimate children in New York, he deserted his
wife, and, without an attempt to obtain a divorce, went through
a form of marriage in New .ersey with another woman, by
whoi he had two illegitimate children. He then became domiciled in Michigan, where he procured a decree of divorce from
his first wife, who still resided in New York, on the ground of
See, denying tort liability, Britton v. lVater Co., 81 Wis. 48;
233; Nichol
Fowler v. Athens, 83 Ga. 210; House v. Wl'ater Co., 88 Tex.
V. W1,ater Co., g3 jV. Va. 348; Fitch v. Water Co., 139 Ind. 214.
0Mugge v. lVater Works, 52 Fla. 371; see also Guardian Trust Co.

v. Fisher,2oo U. S. 69.
"29 Am. St. Rep. 863.
13o Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 19io; 9o N. Y. 458, 19o8.
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desertion. The only service was by publication, and the decree
was granted by default. He then married the mother of his
illegitimate children, who claimed a share of the New York real
estate on the ground that they were thus legitimated under a
Michigan statute.
The New York Court of Appeals held they were not entitled
to share in the estate onl two grounds: (i) that the Michigan
marriage was invalid because the Michigan Court had never
obtained jurisdiction over the first wife of Benjamin F. Olimsted and therefore the divorce was void; (2) that the Michigan legitimating statute was passed after the estate had vested
in Olmsted's four legitimate children and could not have the
effect of divesting their estates.
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
on the ground that full faith and credit had not been given to
the 'Michigan decree. The judgnent of the New York Court
was affirmed on the sec'nd ground on which it was based. The
Court said, "The Legislature of Michigan had no power to pass
an act which would affect the transmission of title to lands
located in the State of New York. No more had it power to
legislate concerning the titles to lands in New York than the
Courts of Michigan, by their judgments, would have authority
to adjudicate such rights. . . . We hold that there is
nothing in the Federal Constitution requiring the Courts ot itie
State of New York to give force and effect to the statute of
the State of 'Michigan so as to contro! the devolution of title to
lands in New York." On this ground the decision seems unquesti6nably sound.
An interesting question is. however, raised by the first and
main ground of the New York judgment. Its effect seems to be
(i) to modify the doctrine that "the proper law" to determine
legitimation by subsequent marriage is the law of the domicile
of the father at the time of the marriage, and (2) to qualify the
New York doctrine as to foreign divorces.
1. Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage.
"The true rule, ifthe legitimation is based upon the marriage
of the parents as the final act necessary to complete it, is that
the law of the father's domicile at the time of the marriage
(which will also be that of the mother and child) should determine the status of both father and child," 2 and such status
"is to be accepted in other jurisdictions for the purpose of the
descent of real property and the distribution of personal prop'Minor Conflict of Laws, p.
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erty." - Applying this doctrine strictly to the case under discussion, the conclusion would seem inevitable that Olmsted's
children were legitimated by the law of Michigan by his
marriage there, and therefore they should have been recognized
as legitimate in New York, even for the purpose of inheriting
land in New York. The opinion of the New York Court of
Appeals, therefore, seems to modify the general rule, as above
stated, by grafting upon it an exception where the legitimating
marriage is polygamous or incestuous under the rules of private
international law in force in the forum. This seems to have
been the thought in the mind of the- Court when it says that
the legitimating statutes, "both in this State and in Michigan,
only relate to such marriages between" parents as may be lawfully made and not to those which are polygamous, incestuous,
or are prohibited by law." The-question, therefore, of the
legitimacy of the children depends on whether Olmsted's second marriage was, under the New York doctrine of international law, polygamous, which in turn depends upon the New
York view as to the validity and effect of the Michigan divorce.
Doctrine of Divorce in New York.
The New York doctrine of divorce is that it is a proceeding
purely in personarn;"and the same process is required to bring
the defendant before the Court as is required if the design
were to fasten upon him or her a general .pecuniary liability."
The New York Courts hold that "no foreign divorce obtained in
a State where the plaintiff alone is domiciled will be valid extraterritorially, unless the defendant voluntarily appears or is personally served with process within5 the jurisdict;on of the
divorce court." 4 In People v. Baker, however, the Court said:
"We must and do concede that a State may adjudge the status
of its citizen toward a non-resident; and may authorize to
that end such judicial proceedings as it sees fit; and that other
States must acquiesce so long as the operation of the judgment
is kept within its own confines." This, as pointed out in Dunham. v. Dunhani, seems to lead to the anomalous doctrine that
the libellant, domiciled within a foreign jurisdiction, may in
such a case be validly divorced from a respondent domiciled in
2.

"'WhartonConflict of Laws. 3 ed., VoL I, p. 553; Re Goodman;'

L R. i7 Ch. Div. 266; Miller v. Miller, gi N. Y. 315; Scott v. Key, it
L.a. Ann. 232.

'Minor Conflict of Law=, p. 204; Matter of Kimball, 155 N. Y. 62;
People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 7&
'76 N. Y. 78.
6 162 IlL. 59
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New York who renans married. If this theory were applied
to the case before us, the result would seem to be that Benjamin
F. Olmsted was validly divorced in Michigah (though his wife
in New York remiained married) and that therefore his second
marriage could not, even in New York, be held to be polygamous. It would seem, therefore, that the New York Court of
Appeals has at last openly rejected any such absurd and indefensible doctrine,' and now holds that a foreign divorce is either
valid as to both parties or invalid as to both parties.
H.E.

Loss TO REAL ESTATE OCCURRING BETWEEN
CONTRACT OF SALE AND EXECUTION OF CONVEYANCE.

ACCIDENTAL

Where there is a contract to sell real estate, but before the
conveyance has been actually executed, a loss by fire or othervise occurs to such real estate, the question has been often
raised as to which party must bear the loss, the vendor or the
vendee. This question was presented to the New Jersey Court
in the recent case of Cropper v. Brown, 78 AtI. 387, where the
purchaser at a sheriff's sale on a ficri facias to foreclose a mortgage signed a contract to purchase on the conditions of sale.
Before the Court confirmed the sale and a conveyance was
executed, a building on the land in question was destroyed by
fire and the purchaser prayed to be relieved of his bid or have
the loss deducted. The Court, however, applied the doctrine
of equitable conversion and held the purchaser had acquired an
equitable interest in the property, so that the loss fell on him.
The early English doctrine seems to have been that losses
occurring between the contract of sale and execution of the
conveyance fell upon the vendor. In 1724 it was stated as
follows: "If I should buy a house, and before such time as by
the articles I am to pay for the same the house be burnt down
by casualty of fire, I shall not in equity be bound to pay for
the house." I
The great weight of modern authority, however, is in accord
with the doctrine of the principal case I and holds that the

'The United States Suprcme Court had in 1go forced the New
York Court of Appeals to reject the doctrine where the full faith and
credit clause was involved (Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155).
I Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. Wins. 220.
*Poole v. Adams, 332 J. Ch. N. S. 639; Johnston, v. Jones, 12 B.
Mon. 326; Marks v. Tichcnor, 85 Ky. 536; Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md.
301; McKechine v. Sterling, 48 Barb. (N. Y. 330; Gates v. Sm ith, 4
Ed. 702 (N. Y.); Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 2oo; Morgan v. Scott, 26 Pa.
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vendee under a contract for the sale of lands takes an equitablh.
title to the lands, while the vendor holds the legal title in trust
for the purchaser and as security for the purchase price due
him. The vendee being the owner in equity of the land receives
as such all benefits arising therefrom and must bear all losses.
As a consequence the burning down of buildings on the premises contracted for will not relieve the vendee of his purchase
nor entitle him to a reduction in the purchase price.
Where this doctrine is in force two exceptions have, however, been noted by the cases,3 and where they apply the vendee
does not have to bear the loss. The first is where there was an
express contract by the vendor to deliver the land with the
btildiings thereon in the same situation as when the sale was
made, and the other is, where the buildings were destroyed by
the culpable negligence of the vendor.
The result reached is strengthened by the decision of the
Courts that the vendee has an insurable interest in the premises
after the contract of sale, and might have protected himself by
insurance.'
There is,. however, a class of cases following Thompson v.
Gould 5 in Massachusetts, which hold that the loss falls on the
rules applicable to cases of personal propvendor, applying the
erty.9 Wilde, J.,7 epitomizes the underlying principles of this
doctrine thus: "In respect to the loss of personal property,
under like circumstances, the principle of law is perfectly clear
and well established by the authorities. When there is an
agreement for the sale and purchase of goods and chattels, and
after the agreement and before the sale is completed, the property is destroyed by casualty, the loss must be borne by the
vendor, the property remaining vested in him at the time of the
destruction. No reason has been given, nor can be given, why
the same principle should not be applied to real estate. The
principle in no respects depends upon the nature and quality of
the property and there can, therefore, be no distinction between
real and personal estate."
Where, however, the subject of the sale has been mixed
5i; Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 5T3; Hill v. Co., 59 Pa. 474; Oldham
v. Kennedy, 3 Hump. 24o (Tenn.).
'Morgan v. Scott, 26 Pa. 5; Marks %%Tichenor 85 Ky. 536.
9 McKehnie v. Sterling, 48 Barb. 330; Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler,

16 Wend. 38-.
'20 Pick. 134.

'Gould v. Murch. 70 Me. 218; WVells v. Calnan, io7 Mass. 514; Wilson v. Clarke, 6o N. H. 352.
' Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134.
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realty and personalty, even in jurisdictions applying the doctrine of ownership in equity, the vendor, it has been held, must
bear the loss and not the vendee. 8
In the principal case the fact that the loss occurred before
the confirmation of the judicial sale by the Court was not held
of importance so as to relieve the vendee of the burden of the
loss. That has not, however, been the uniform application of
the doctrine of the vendee's liability because of ownership in
equity. On a master's sale, it has been held in a New York
case a that the buyer, in equity, becomes the owner from the
day the report of the sale is confirmed, and the premises are,
then, at his risk even though he has not received a deed. A loss
by fire, after such confirmation and before such deed, falls upon
the buyer: but the Court says, "Not so where the loss is prior
respect
to the cnfirmation of the rep)rt." The same rule with
10
to judicial sales is in force in the English chancery.
S.D.C.
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS.

Editor "University of Pennsvh'aniaLaw Rcview and American
Law Register."
Dear Sir: The interesting note in the May number of your
magazine very clearly sets forth the objcctions to the reasoning
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the recent case of
Si-gwarth's Estate, 226 Pa. 591 (i9io). The decision, however. can be sustained upon grounds which apparently did not
occur to either Court or counsel.
There was a gift of the estate in trust to pay the income to
the beneficiaries, and if they should die without issue, then the
share was to revert back to the heirs of the testator. There'is
authority for the proposition that the general rule that failure
of issue at the death of the first taker is to be referred to the
life of the testator, is not applicable to the case where the share
is given in trust, and there is a direction to pay the income to
the beneficiary. The form of the gift in this case indicates an
intention to give a life estate. Estate of John Mecke, 16 Phila.
304 (i883). If this construction is correct, the case is that of
a gift in trust for life, wi-.h a vested remainder in the heirs of
the testator subject to be divested by the death of the life tenant
leaving issue, with discretionary power in the trustee to termiClintn v. Hope Ins. Co.. 45 N. Y. 454.
"Gn!es v. Smith. 4 Fdw. /o2.
"Ex parte Minor, ix Ves., Jr.. 559.
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nate the trust and pay over the principal to the beneficiary
after five years from the death of the testator. This being the
case, neither the beneficiary nor his assignees had any standing
to terminate the trust, the five years not having expired, and
even after the five years had expired, the case would be the
same, because neither could compel the trustee to exercise the
discretion. The reasoning of the Supreme Court, that the mere
circumstances of putting the interest in trust makes the equitable interest non-assignable is, of course, open to very serious
objection and totally overlooks the real nature of a trust.
R.R.F.

